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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

FROM: Richard G. Stilwell
 Chairman, SIG-I Working Group
 Via CCISCMS/ICS, 1225 Ames Bldg.

EXTENSION NO.

DCI/ICS-86-0850

DATE

2 July 1986

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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B-318-1r

DCI/ICS-86-0850
2 July 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SIG-I
FROM: R. G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.)
SUBJECT: Professional Integrity

1. On 26 June, someone finally had the courtesy to show me the attached memorandum. Please note that it is dated 23 May; that it concerns the report whose drafting you asked me to oversee; and that it contains a number of comments which are professionally disparaging of the undersigned. Given the memorandum's routing and the absence of any commentary, I must assume that the senior echelons of the Agency and the Community Staff believe [] points are an accurate summary of the state of affairs. They are decidedly not.

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2. Item: Stilwell's report, not a Presidential report. Patently ludicrous! The draft of the main report and of the abbreviated version will be reviewed by the several IGs and their comments will be reflected in what is served up to the SIG-I for further review/modification/approval. You will determine what goes forward to the White House via the NSC Staff. But the start point must be a strawman to shoot at.

3. Item: Stilwell is unilaterally determining the report content. Incorrect. The draft report is faithful to the outline (15 pages long) which was reviewed and approved by the WG. Based on input (tasked to various agencies and, for the most part, inadequate) I undertook, by default, the preparation of the strawman, consulting members of the WG frequently for needed elaboration. As sections were drafted, they were circulated to the WG members (and others) for comment. When meetings were required to discuss sections, meetings have been convened. The main counterintelligence section is endorsed, in toto, at the level of Messrs Major, Donnelly, [] and DuHadway. To be sure, the "for comment" draft to be circulated to the IGs will not have accommodated every comment of every agency in the countermeasures area; I have exercised the judgement you have reason to expect of me. But I must say that CIA's comments have fared well throughout (except in one area as discussed below). Not surprisingly, there are several points on which the Community is sharply divided and the SIG-I will have to grasp the nettle-which is its vested responsibility.

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4. Item: The countermeasures section has a decided DoD tilt. So? The gross estimate is that 85% of the total executive branch activity is in DoD; DoD did an extensive review last year and called a spade, a spade. SecDef accepted and published the report, and has directed implementation of more than 55 of the 63 recommendations flowing from that review. The Select Intelligence Committees concluded that most recommendations were appropriate for the Executive Branch as a whole. The IG/CM has also endorsed many of the recommendations for general adoption.

5. Item: [] has communicated his views to Stilwell. Incorrect. The record will show that at no time during the past five months has [] ever initiated a call to me or sought me out to discuss the concerns reflected in his memorandum. Had he done so, there would be no reason not to drop me a copy. There was one comment, in a memo signed by his deputy [] about too many recommendations. The record will also show that [] has not seen fit to attend the last several WG meetings. Since I believe in open communication, he shall have a copy of this rejoinder, concurrent with its delivery to you.

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6. [] memorandum boils down to two substantive points, one general and one specific. The first lends credence to a perception that the non-intelligence countermeasures community has about Agency attitude: "hands off" anything relating to CIA and SCI; while, conversely, CIA has full rein to critique the non-CIA and non-SCI world. (This is why an empowering NSDD is essential if the revised SIG-I directive is to be given more than cursory attention.) The second has to do with any comment which would suggest that there is room for improvement in the CIA/SCI personnel security area (except more \$), and, in particular, the thought that efforts should continue to bring SCI and TS investigative scopes into closer alignment (apparently [] is not aware of the DDCI's views on this subject).

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7. I did not seek this assignment. You asked for and received my assent because we both know that it would otherwise be difficult to find someone to take on such an onerous--but nonetheless essential--task.

25X1

[]
Richard G./Stilwell

Attachment:
a/s

cc: DDCI
DDA
D/OS
Dep Sec Def

~~2
SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

23 MAY 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: 25X1
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Problems with Draft SIG-I Working Group Report

General Stilwell has submitted for review a draft of the "Plans for Enhancement" section of the President's report to Congress on counterintelligence and security. Listed below are views we presented to the Working Group on three issues fundamental to the proper and successful conduct of CIA's security program. However, counterviews, particularly from DoD, have tended to obscure our position. (C)

Common Scope for Top Secret and SCI

DoD has repeatedly proposed that the scope of investigative coverage for SCI be reduced from 15 years to some shorter period; CIA has repeatedly resisted this. By reducing the scope, DoD hopes to realize some cost savings. However, the unique nature of SCI, its sensitivity and its fragility, and the special and statutory responsibilities of the DCI to protect it, militate against the DoD position.

The greater scope of investigative coverage for access to SCI is designed to compensate for its proliferation and its relatively lax document control (as compared to the more limited distribution and strict accountability of Top Secret information). A 1980 SECOM study indicated that small, but significant, amounts of noteworthy information would be lost if the investigative scope were to be reduced to even 10 years. However, we recognize the need for current research regarding the cost and utility of various aspects of our investigative process. Such research would allow us to participate in meaningful discussions with DoD and others on this subject. Until such research is completed, however, the Office of Security is strongly opposed to any reduction in the pre-screening protection currently afforded SCI. (S)

~~SECRET~~25X1¹

S E C R E T

Preempting NSDD-84 Working Group

The draft report contains several pages of recommendations and statements which would, in effect, impose direction and substance on the Working Group which was chartered by Presidential directive (NSDD-84) to prepare a new Executive Order on personnel security. Many of these recommendations and statements contain inaccuracies and elements which are either unacceptable to CIA, and other agencies such as OPM and DOE not represented on the Stilwell Working Group, or which require further study before being considered as something to be mandated. We also object in principle to preempting the prerogatives of a properly chartered and expert interagency group. We believe this detailed section should be replaced with a general statement to be provided by or coordinated with the NSDD-84 Working Group. (S)

Restrictions on the Scope of Polygraph Testing

In the draft and in virtually every document we have seen from DoD which mentions polygraph testing, the phrase, "counterintelligence-scope polygraph" is used. We are concerned that continual use of this phrase as a general description of polygraph testing may eventually result in a universal perception that such limited testing is the only proper and permissible kind. This could adversely affect the CIA polygraph program in future years and could make it extremely difficult for other agencies to implement expanded polygraph programs if they chose to do so. This very problem was recognized by the NSDD-84 Working Group which decided to avoid such restrictive language. Where applicable, we have offered the alternative language, "polygraph testing as deemed appropriate by the agency head and in compliance with applicable law and regulation." (S)

General Comments on the Working Group Paper

In addition to the above major points, I am disappointed by the overall scope and utility of the Stilwell product. The Working Group met for long hours over the course of many weeks, deliberating pertinent issues and gathering and refining information. We expected this information to be distilled into a concise "Presidential" statement of basic functions, accomplishments, shortfalls and issues, plus policy and program direction for the 1980's.


S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Instead, the report is emerging, not as a distillation, but as an expansion of the Working Group's efforts with a decidedly DoD tilt flavored strongly with what appear to be General Stilwell's own views. As an expansion, it contains new issues which have not been adequately discussed and presents some contentious issues in a way which improperly implies interagency agreement.

Also, as an expanded document, the report no longer pretends to be "Presidential". We understand that General Stilwell intends to forward the report with a covering memorandum of endorsement for the President's signature. Because the report is so overly detailed and contains many recommendations, some of them controversial, ambiguous or premature, I believe it will cause more harm than good if it is provided to the Congress without considerable pruning. I am advising General Stilwell of my concerns but he has made it quite clear that he is committed to the present scope and thrust; I expect only token concessions as the draft is finalized. (S)

25X1



S E C R E T

DCI/ICS-86-0850
2 July 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SIG-I
FROM R. G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.)
SUBJECT: Professional Integrity

CCISCMS/ICS:RG Stilwell:gdc

25X1

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
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S E C R E T

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Problems with Draft SIG-1 Working Group Report



FROM

Director of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

OS 6 2101B

DATE

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Deputy Director
for Administration

29 MAY 1986

WHD

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3. Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence

5/30/86

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Give me copy

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15.

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REG

B-318-IR

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
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